Abstract: This article considers the state of research on the two-way relationship of causation between politics and war in ancient Athens from the attempted coup of Cylon in 632 BC to the violent overthrow of its democracy by the Macedonians in 322. Also canvassed is how a closer integration of Ancient History and Political Science can enhance the research of each discipline into the important problem of democracy's effect on war-making. Classical Athens is well known for its full development of popular politics and its cultural revolution, which clearly was a dependent variable of the democracy. By contrast, few are aware of its contemporaneous military revolution, which saw the classical Athenians intensify the waging of war and gain an unrivalled record of military success and innovation. Although a prima facie case exists for these military changes being due to popular government, ancient historians have conducted very little research on the impact of democracy on war. In the last decade our discipline has also witnessed the collapse of the longstanding understanding of the affect of military changes on political developments in ancient Greece, which means we can no longer explain why Athenian democracy emerged and was consolidated during the classical period. For the sake of ameliorating this situation the article proposes new directions 
450s the people had consolidated their new d mokratia ('democracy') by making decisions on an increasing range of public affairs and by taking over entirely the administration of justice and the oversight of magistrates. 4 Admittedly Athenian leaders were still members of the upper class, struggling for pre-eminence with each other. 5 Now, however, their rivalries were played out in ag&nes or political debates, with the final decision to support this or that politician resting with predominantly non-elite assembly-goers and councillors. 6 To win over such notoriously boisterous and censorious audiences, politicians other democracies of the Greek world the Athenian example avoided the stasis or civil-strife which destroyed so many others and, with the exception of short periods of oligarchy in 411 and 404, enjoyed two centuries of unbroken operation.
11
In addition the Athenian democracy handled a significantly larger amount of public business, while its strong fiscal position meant it could pay assembly-goers, councillors, jurors and magistrates, allowing a wider social spectrum of citizens to be politically active. 12 As a consequence, the ideological and practical development of the Athenian democracy was very much fuller than any other of pre-modern times. Indeed no subsequent democracy has ever 'Civic Institutions and Self-Government in Southern Mesopotamia in the Mid-First Millenium BC', in Assyria and Beyond: Studies Presented to Mogens Trolle Larsen, ed. J.G. Dercksen (Leuven, 2004), pp. 47-98; Robinson, First Democracies, pp. 16-25. 11 For the other democracies of classical Greece, J.L. O'Neil, The Origins and enjoyed the same extraordinary levels of engagement and participation among its citizens. 13 For example, the weekly assembly-meetings of classical Athens were attended by several thousand, while in the fourth century two thirds of the city's thirty-thousand citizens willingly served on the Council of Five Hundred.
14 Not without reason Athens has been an inspiration for modern democrats since the nineteenth century. 15 George Grote and other leading liberals of Victorian England assiduously employed this example of a prosperous and stable democracy to build political support for extending the right to vote. 16 Athens today is celebrated as the ancient predecessor of our 13 M.H. Hansen, 'The Tradition of the Athenian Democracy A.D. 1750 -1990 ', Greece and Rome, 39 (1992 democracies and its participatory politics increasingly studied for new ways to address current political challenges.
Classical Athens was also the leading cultural centre of the Greek world.
The disciplines of the visual arts, oratory, drama and literature were developed to a far higher level of quality in this city, with many of the works produced there becoming canonical for Graeco-Roman antiquity. Ever since Johann Winckelmann, the eighteenth-century founder of Classical Archaeology, this cultural revolution has been interpreted as the product of Athenian democracy.
17
Certainly the new requirement for elite playwrights, politicians and litigants to compete for the favour of mass audiences drove rapid innovations in oratory and drama. 18 For example, the celebrated plays of Athens were performed in front of thousands of citizens at state-sponsored ag&nes or contests. While the chief magistrate selected and paid the playwrights, the training and costumes of the performers were the responsibility of chorus sponsors. 19 These elite citizens had a great deal riding on the performance of their choruses. 20 Victory translated into political influence and support, while the generous financing of choruses could be canvassed during trials to help win over jurors. 21 For the sake of their careers poets too wanted to be victorious. 22 Although the judging of choral contests was formally in the hands of magistrates, they were guided by the vocal and physically active responses of the largely non-elite theatre-goers. Ober, Mass and Elite, Wilson, Athenian Institution, For the political advantages, see, for example, Plutarch Nicias 3.1-3. For so-called festival liturgies as a plus in legal proceedings, see, for example, Lysias 3. 46, 12.38, 18.23, 20.31, 21.1-6, 25.12-13, 30.1. 22 E.g. Aristophanes Wasps 1043-50. London, 1997), pp. 97-111, pp. 98-106. accommodating the points of view of lower-class citizens but also by pushing the boundaries of their genres.
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This performance dynamic of mass and elite did not constrain the historians and philosophers of classical Athens, who wrote for upper-class readers. As such they were free to express anti-democratic biases and elite preoccupations. The Cleisthenic reforms of 508 gave control of foreign affairs to ordinary Athenians and massively increased their military capacity.
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In 506 their army defeated those of Chalcis and Boeotia in back-to-back battles, in 499 they sent twenty ships to help the Ionian Greeks revolt from the Persian Empire and, in 490, at the battle of Marathon they deployed nine-thousand heavily armed soldiers, which was a hoplite army far larger than any other city-state (including Sparta).
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The transformation of military practice by the Athenians effectively began with their novel decision of 483 to use a windfall of silver to build a navy of two-hundred triremes and with the expedition of the Persians, three years later, to subjugate the Greeks of the mainland as they had recently done to those of Ionia and the Dardanelles.
37
The final destruction of this huge Persian force, in 479, and the inability of the Spartans to effectively lead the liberation of the Ionians saw the Athenians invited to found the so-called Delian League, which initially was a voluntary alliance of city-states contributing ships and soldiers or annual tribute to Athenian-led expeditions. In this new form of mobile sea warfare a standard tactic was retreat, which was a source of shame among hoplites. 44 Among several other innovations, the Athenians also built tens of kilometres of walls to protect their city and its port and to fortify the corridor between the two. 45 With these fortifications in place, they developed a new way of responding to the invasion of a hoplite army: instead of the traditional sending out of one's own hoplites for a pitched battle, they could now withdraw their farmers and moveable property within the Athens-Piraeus complex and rely on the imported grain and tribute which were guaranteed by their sea power.
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By the time the democracy and its empire were consolidated, war dominated the politics and popular culture of Athens and the lives of its citizens.
The Athenians were now the dominant military power in the eastern Mediterranean and were moving large forces over long distances for campaigns which lasted months, or in the case of sieges, up to a year. In this regard historians of ancient Greece have not been an exception: they have assumed warfare to be a coherent subject of study in its own right and hence explicable without reference to political and social factors. However, the work of each scholar leaves something to be desired: Hanson largely postulates rather than proves the impact of democratic decision-making, Raaflaub accepts a straightforward military determinism, which no longer seems valid (see below) and, in view of its publication forty years ago, the sketch of Vidal-Naquet is somewhat out of date.
This lack of scholarly attention should be a cause of concern. The end of the Cold War has presented established democracies with a range of new security challenges, which have become more complex since the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Today governments are under strong public pressure to intervene in civil wars or failing states and are wrestling with how to reconcile open government, due legal process and personal liberty with the perceived demands of counterterrorism. In addition the United States and some of its allies are promoting democracy militarily in the Middle East and further a field. In these circumstances we should understand better than we do whether our democratic institutions are properly designed for the optimal development and execution of foreign policy and whether our democracy-promotion efforts are well conceived. The two-way relationship of democracy and war would appear then to be an important problem for ancient historians: through its investigation our discipline can explain a striking feature of Athenian history, help fill a l'hoplite athénien', in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, ed. J.-P. Vernant (Paris, 1968), pp. 161-82. significant gap in current scholarship and potentially enhance our understanding of contemporary security challenges.
III NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
To help address this gap in our knowledge the author has invited sixteen leading archaeologists, ancient historians, classicists and political scientists from around the world to explore collaboratively the relationship between war, culture and democracy in classical Athens. The papers of this group were delivered at a Sydney conference in July 2006 and will be published as an edited collection by Cambridge University Press. revolution -but from slow, incremental changes in tactics and weaponry. 76 We have also seen how in Athens, before 508, hoplites remained predominantly upper class, while any major impact of military activity on political change is unlikely in view of the infrequency and small scale of sixth-century campaigns.
Finally the linking of democracy and sea power has been shown to be a purely ideological construction, which was forged for polemical purposes by PseudoXenophon, Plato and other philosophical critics of the Athenian democracy.
77
There is simply no evidence that non-elite Athenians ever believed their legal and political equality were a result of their ability to contribute militarily to the city. participatory or direct democracy in any period of world history, new research into this process of democratisation seems a matter of some urgency for our discipline. A good place of departure for this research would be the revolution of 508 and the reforms of Cleisthenes. These reforms not only institutionalised the rule of the d mos ('people') but effectively integrated Athens and its countryside for the first time.
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Each free male of Attica was now registered as a citizen of Athens in his local deme and groups of these villages and suburbs from across Athenian territory were linked together in ten tribes, which served as the subdivisions of the new popular council and publicly controlled army of hoplites. The new registers of citizens in the demes were used to conscript hoplites for each tribal corps.
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This was the city's first-ever mechanism for mass mobilization and the standard way for raising hoplites until the mid-fourth century.
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As Athens and its surrounding territory were around twenty times larger and more populous than the average-sized polis, this mechanism gave the The reforms which Cleisthenes devised may have brought democracy and strong state structures to Athens for the first time, but they were not (as is regularly suggested) the product of upper-class 'social engineering' and hence 'a vision from above, not below'. 
IV THE UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
For the pursuit of these new directions for research ancient historians will probably get some assistance from the social sciences. The use of social-science theory may be uncontroversial in other disciplines of the humanities but it is not yet standard practice in our discipline, at times raising the ire of its more traditional practitioners. However, the use of social-science theory holds great promise for ancient historians: it helps us ensure the 'common-sense', discipline-based and ethnocentric assumptions, inevitably informing our interpretations, are plausible and scientifically valid. 
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This needs to be complex enough to allow for the possibility of proving it false. Such a theory normally consists of a number of subordinate hypotheses, which must accord with the evidence already available and be logically consistent with each other. Keohane, King and Verba explain how the testing of a theory is guided by its 'observable implications '. 95 These are the results of our hypotheses which we anticipate and are able to detect if our theory is correct. With a good number of such predictions in hand, we know what data needs to be gathered for empirical testing. Such evidence usually confirms some of our hypotheses, disproves others and suggests new ones requiring testing in due course.
An empirically proven theory, however, is not necessarily the end of the matter; for a serious problem of causal inference is its unacceptably high uncertainty, when only applied to a solitary unit of study. (Princeton, 1994), pp. 14-19. 94 comparison.
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As a theory in one unit of study should be applicable to other examples of the same class, proving our hypotheses work elsewhere makes more likely our classification of the phenomenon we are explaining as a dependent variable and our identification of its independent variables or causes. In addition the comparison of a case study with two or more independent variables to a comparable example where one of these is absent helps determine the relative importance of these in our original unit.
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The final step is the using of evidence at hand to describe the 'causal mechanisms' whereby our causes bring about their established effects.
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The advantages of this social-science approach can be seen clearly when it is applied to the impact of democracy on Athenian warfare: this method not only ensures scientifically valid knowledge but brings focus and structure to the research process. We have already seen how this side of the causal symbiosis meets the criteria Keohane, King and Verba discuss for an important question: it concerns a striking feature of Athenian history, addresses a gap in our knowledge and encourages more critical thinking about contemporary security challenges. In addition progress has also been made on a theory to answer this question: the Sydney conference of last July marshalled plausible hypotheses Lyons (Princeton, 1989), pp. 39-52; L'autre guerrier: archers, peltastes, cavaliers dans and in the fourth century before and after the ephebic reform of 335. military success of the Thebans clearly followed a democratic revolution.
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The second way of reducing the uncertainty of causal inference is the breaking down of a case study into distinct units of study, which underlines the importance of segmenting data-selection on ancient Athens into century-long periods. While the comparison of the military records of Athens in the sixth and fifth centuries suggests democracy was an independent variable for its military revolution, this leaves a troubling ambiguity: we cannot determine the weight of democracy relative to the other causes of demography and imperial revenue. Here the treating of fourth-century Athens as a separate unit of study can be very useful.
Athens of this century probably had the same-sized citizen-body as in the sixth but no longer enjoyed the imperial revenue it had in the fifth. Unfortunately the same cannot be done from this point down to 322, when the democracy was increasingly treated at Athens as the natural system of government and modified very effectively as the need to do so became clear, because of our almost total lack of detailed evidence for the operation and history of other Greek democracies. As a result, comparison can probably only be made with modern case studies of democratic consolidation.
V THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCY OF ANCIENT ATHENS
The interplay of democracy and foreign policy is of clear importance today. 
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A good way to deepen our thinking on these contemporary problems lies in the so-called lessons of history.
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The track records of past democracies can help us identify and test our own assumptions about democracy and war and suggest new ways for thinking about their interaction. Athens was of course smaller than an averaged-sized modern state and had a participatory rather than representative democracy, which was based on different social relations.
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These differences make it impossible to project conclusions about Athens directly onto contemporary affairs. On the other hand, this city-state had the only fully developed democracy of pre-modern times, whose richly documented history allows us to analyse its operation thoroughly. The canonical status of its drama and oratory means hundreds of its literary works have survived, while its so-called epigraphical habit of recording decrees on stone has given us a huge archive of its political activity. For a judicious discussion of the differences and similarities between ancient and modern democracy, see Robinson, First Democracies, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] In this world Athens was clearly a runaway success: its democracy was more fully developed and longstanding than any other and largely avoided the stasis which destroyed so many democracies. Athens also outperformed others militarily: it dominated the eastern Mediterranean in the fifth century and remained a major regional power and military innovator in the next. As such its democratic institutions and practices were proven successes.
Since the 1970s ancient historians have increasingly pointed this out: while rightly abhorring its patriarchy and chattel slavery, they have nonetheless suggested that the democracy of the Athenians provides us with well tested possibilities for addressing current political challenges. Athens contributed to its military success, ancient historians can make available potential solutions to our security challenges. Admittedly these contributions of Athens to the modern world may be modest. However, in light of the relative lack of scholarship on democracy and war in any period of world history and the complexity of the foreign-policy challenges we face, they will undoubtedly be valuable. 
